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ABSTRACT
This article demonstrates that the issue-yield concept is able to predict the elect-
oral strategies of mainstream and challenger parties at the 2017 German federal
election. While the electorate of mainstream parties favour valence issues, the
Greens and the AfD can gain more by concentrating on socio-cultural positional
issues. Relying on a unique survey covering 17 positional issues and 10 valence
issues as well as an analysis of Twitter accounts, the article shows that contem-
porary Germany is characterised by a centrifugal competition on the socio-cul-
tural dimension. At the same time, an asymmetric ideological confrontation
persists on the socio-economic dimension, because the Left and the SPD still
refer to their traditional welfare issues while the bourgeois parties no longer
counter this with a contrasting free-market ideology. Thus, the economy is cur-
rently not the decisive issue in German politics. Migration, integration, and other
socio-cultural issues are rather driving electoral competition.
KEYWORDS Party competition; Germany; issue-yield; socio-cultural dimension; valence issues
Germany, for decades the perfect example of a stable and effective party sys-
tem, has finally joined the majority of other European states: a pronoun-
cedly right-wing populist party entered the federal parliament for the first
time in 2017 and made government formation much more difficult. In this
article covering the 2017 Bundestag election campaign, we argue that the
current nature of political competition in Germany can be characterised by
two major developments. First, although later than in other European coun-
tries, the electorate in Germany began to align strongly on socio-cultural
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issues. However, German parties’ programmatic positions continue to refer
also to the traditional socio-economic dimension. Second, German party
competition is characterised by the effects of a so-called Grand Coalition of
two large mainstream parties located in the ideological centre. After the
early election in 2005, which marked the end of the red–green Schr€oder
government, two out of three governments were Grand Coalitions of the
CDU/CSU and SPD. Hence, discontent with the government could only be
expressed by voting for parties not located at the centre, which, at least to a
substantial degree, led to the formation of yet another Grand Coalition after
the election analysed in this contribution.
There are many ways to conceptualise political competition and its con-
sequences for party behaviour and party system configurations. Identical to
the other contributions in this special issue, we rely on the concept of issue
yield (e.g. De Sio and Weber 2014) as our general framework. In short, the
concept means that campaign strategies of political parties are not simply
driven by the systemic (i.e. overall) salience of political issues and a given
party’s competence profile. Instead, parties focus on issues where their pos-
ition is almost unanimously shared by their supporters and widely shared
by the electorate at large, so that they can expect electoral gains. Hence,
issue yield should influence parties’ electoral strategies and campaigns while
informing us about the nature and structure of political competition at the
same time. In a modification to the original approach, the electoral poten-
tial of valence issues can also be taken into account by incorporating expli-
cit measures of party credibility (De Sio and Weber 2019) which – as we
argue below – is very important for an adequate representation of current
political competition in Germany.
We focus on three major research questions: first, we examine to what
extent the classical ideological conceptualisations of the twentieth century
are still valid for German parties. We do so by looking at the issue-yield
patterns in terms of more left-wing and more right-wing policy stances
for both the economic and the cultural dimensions of political conflict.
Second, we analyse the different vote-maximising potentials of position
and valence issues for governing and opposition parties. Third, we test
one of the core assumptions of the issue-yield theory in that parties are
less driven by systemic salience than by their party-specific risk–opportu-
nity calculations. We rely on a unique pre-election mass survey providing
information on 17 position and 10 valence issues and on Twitter data of
electoral campaign frontrunners for each party (see online appendix for
details). The survey data is used to calculate issue-yield scores while the
Twitter data refers to party campaign strategies as it allows different levels
of issue emphasis to be distinguished.
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We demonstrate that contemporary Germany is characterised by cen-
trifugal party competition on the socio-cultural dimension. At the same
time, an asymmetric ideological confrontation on the socio-economic
dimension persists because the post-communist Left Party (Left) and the
SPD still refer to their traditional welfare issues even though the Christian
Democrats do not contrast this with a free-market ideology. Further, we
show that the German governing parties CDU/CSU and SPD mainly
address valence issues, while especially the right-wing populist Alternative
for Germany (AfD) and the Greens concentrate on socio-cultural position
issues. The AfD and the Greens had unified support within their elector-
ates, particularly regarding immigration, while the support of the CDU/
CSU and SPD was split over this issue. Hence, the mainstream governing
parties avoided position issues in order not to alienate parts of their own
electorate. The Liberals (FDP) faced a specific strategic situation because
they needed to fight for re-entry into the Bundestag after their electoral
meltdown in 2013. Yet their core issues belong to the declining economic
dimension in which they are set apart on the right side of the dimension
from all other parties – except the AfD (Franzmann 2019). However, we
also show that the FDP benefits from valence issues more than all other
smaller parties. The article concludes with an outlook on future problems
of government formation in Germany due to the asymmetries in party
competition.
The transforming political space of Germany
The central idea of issue-yield theory is that parties adopt their issue stan-
ces according to their individual risk–opportunity profile. Hence, accord-
ing to this model, concentrating on issues with the highest systemic
salience is not the most promising strategy. Instead, parties will focus on
those issues which unite their core voters and, at the same time, are
widely supported by the overall electorate (De Sio 2018: 398). Put differ-
ently, policy goals that could attract many votes from the overall elector-
ate are only emphasised if they do not alienate the core electorate.
Therefore, issue yield can be defined ‘as the degree to which an issue
allows a party to overcome the conflict between protection and expansion
of electoral support’ (De Sio and Weber 2014: 871). The interaction of
political parties with the electorate is analysed as acting on an ‘issue-mar-
ket’ where policy-goals are ‘exchanged’ via communication (Franzmann
2011). Due to the process of de-ideologisation, parties are relatively free
to combine each kind of issue beyond traditional cleavage politics. Parties
can pursue problem-solving or conflict-mobilisation strategies, while the
latter is not necessarily related to the traditional cleavages (De Sio and
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Lachat 2019). Furthermore, an important general assumption within the
issue-yield framework is that parties can actively change the character of
an issue as being valence or positional. Depending on the current state of
the public debate an issue can be perceived as commonly shared. In this
case, party competition over this particular issue concentrates on prob-
lem-solving credibility, even if this issue could theoretically be framed as
a positional (D’Alimonte et al. 2019).
German party competition provides a very interesting case for applying
the issue-yield concept. In contrast to other European democracies dis-
cussed in this special issue, Germany has not moved towards de-ideolo-
gised politics. Instead, socio-cultural issues drive a process of re-
ideologisation while economic issues are currently of lower salience as a
result of a flourishing economy. At the same time, we show how the
issue-yield concept can help us to better understand the state of German
party competition.
In order to formulate expectations of how German parties react to this
changing environment, we will first discuss the transformation of the
demand side (the electorate), and then we will show that the supply side
of the issue-market is still struggling with adapting to this transformation.
The demand side: the socio-cultural turn of the German electorate
The transformation of the German political space came in two instal-
ments. The most obvious effects of these changes were, first, the emer-
gence of the Greens and, second, the rather ‘belated’ establishment of the
right-wing populist AfD, accompanied by the electoral decline of the SPD
and the overall increase of party-system fragmentation. These are all
symptoms of a phenomenon several scholars already described during the
past decades. Some labelled it as the change from class-based to ‘new pol-
itics’ (e.g. Dalton 1985; Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990; Poguntke 1987),
following the idea that a ‘silent revolution’ established a conflict over
post-materialist attitudes (Inglehart 1984). Ignazi (1992) diagnosed a
‘silent counter-revolution’ that would lead to the establishment of right-
wing populist parties across Europe. The importance of economic issues
has been declining for decades. Simultaneously, socio-cultural issues have
grown increasingly salient. Politics struggles less about economic con-
cerns. Kriesi et al. (2008) argued that this development is boosted by the
process of de-nationalisation and globalisation. While at the beginning
issues of self-actualisation and environmental protection led to an
increased salience of non-economic issues (Inglehart 1984), now issues
related to new demarcation/integration conflict (Kriesi et al. 2008) domin-
ate the socio-cultural dimension of political contestation. In the
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consequence, a ‘new cultural divide’ (Bornschier 2010) has started struc-
turing party competition. Kitschelt (1994, 2003: 130) illustrated this
change by an elliptic configuration of voter demands for policies that
changed from a horizontal, economic ‘left–right’ to a diagonal placement
within the political space. The poles of the vertical axis of the political
space are defined by libertarian or authoritarian attitudes. In the political
science literature, we find a wide range of terms for these attitudes such
as GAL (green, alternative, libertarian) vs. TAN (traditional, authoritarian,
national) by Marks et al. (2006), libertarian–universalistic vs. traditiona-
list–communitarian values by Bornschier (2010), or cosmopolitism vs.
communitarianism by Merkel (2017). Kitschelt (2003: 130) argued that
the diagonal is in the process of turning into a vertical column, represent-
ing an ideological conflict constellation for which the traditional left–right
class distinction would only be of limited importance. Flanagan and Lee
(2003) similarly predicted that economic issues will become valence
issues, while socio-cultural issues will figure as the decisive positional
issues. Germany was long seen as an exceptional case where right-wing
populists were not successful (Arzheimer 2015), arguably because the
experience of the Nazi past had truncated the ideological spectrum (Smith
1982). Furthermore, after reunification, economic issues continued to
dominate the political agenda despite the success of the post-material-
ist Greens.
This changed drastically during the legislative period from 2013 to
2017. The establishment of the AfD followed the pattern Kitschelt and
Bornschier diagnosed for other countries. However, in the German case,
there were also important catalytic events. The so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in
2015 constitutes a critical juncture which led to changing party–voter
alignments and a strong politicisation of immigration issues. People
opposed to immigration from now on tended to support the AfD instead
of the CDU/CSU (Mader and Schoen 2019). The AfD benefited from
becoming the issue-owner of the migration issue (Grande et al. 2019).
Despite the AfD’s early focus on the European integration process and
especially on European currency and financial crisis policy, voters were
mainly attracted by latent anti-immigration attitudes (Schwarzb€ozl and
Fatke 2016). In this vein, Germany is similar to other European countries
(Bechtel et al. 2014). From the beginning, AfD politicians addressed
right-wing populist attitudes and hence the demarcation/integration div-
ide, even if they belonged to the rather moderate and bourgeois econo-
mist wing (Lewandowsky et al. 2016; Franzmann 2016). With Chancellor
Merkel’s decision to open the borders to large numbers of refugees in
summer 2015, migration became the dominant topic within the German
electorate and the public sphere. In combination with the steady decline
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of unemployment and a rather positive overall economic outlook, this
socio-cultural issue dominated the German policy agenda
(Forschungsgruppe Wahlen: Politbarometer 2018). Given this shake-up of
the demand-side agenda, political competition changed drastically for the
political parties compared to earlier elections.
The supply side: towards polarised pluralism
The era of Angela Merkel’s chancellorship has been characterised by
Grand Coalition government (except for 2009–2013). In other words, the
defining feature of the supply side of German party competition was a
centre coalition and a lack of government alternation whereas German
politics had been dominated by a bipolar pattern of party competition
before.1 The electoral weakness of the SPD in conjunction with its refusal
to admit the post-communist Left to a coalition at the federal level left a
Grand Coalition as the only politically viable option. To be sure, there
would have been other majorities in the Bundestag, but these options did
not seem politically feasible. Connected in a Grand Coalition, Christian
and Social Democrats had to defend the same government policy, moving
closer on economic and social policy. Even in the aftermath of the finan-
cial crisis, German party competition was dominated by valence issues
(Clarke and Whitten 2013), and this did not change when a bourgeois
coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP assumed office in 2009. Even more,
Merkel fostered a course of de-polarisation, modernising the CDU’s pos-
ition on gay marriage, child care, and nuclear energy, where she switched
to a nuclear phase-out. Similar to what had happened to the SPD earlier
in the wake of its socio-economic reform agenda, this left the CDU (and
to a lesser degree also the CSU) with a substantially weakened core ideol-
ogy (Poguntke 2014: 960). Nevertheless, Merkel’s decision to switch back
to the nuclear phase-out was also mainly driven by cost–benefits calcula-
tions as substantive segments of CDU sympathisers changed their minds
after the Fukushima disaster. Many CDU voters now held inconsistent
preferences in that they preferred a nuclear phase-out but at the same
preferred the pro-nuclear CDU as a party (Thurner 2017: 175). In order
to avoid vote loss, the CDU/CSU changed its government’s course of
action since there was no competitor promoting nuclear energy in 2011
(Meyer and Schoen 2017). This situation changed with the establishment
of the AfD two years later.
Consequently, a gap opened to the right of the Christian Democrats,
and this is where the AfD entered the competition. Figure 1 illustrates the
German political space at the 2017 federal election. The two-dimensional
position scores are based on the manifesto data (Volkens et al. 2017),
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applying the context-sensitive approach of Franzmann and Kaiser (2006).
It reflects peculiarities of the German party competition, e.g. that support
for the ‘social market economy’ is historically located in the bourgeois
party camp (Franzmann and Kaiser 2006).2
Figure 1 reveals a situation that Marks et al. (2006) identified as a pat-
tern for the whole of Western Europe: all relevant parties are close to a
diagonal from the left-libertarian upper left corner to the right-authoritar-
ian lower right corner. In other words, there is one dimension of party
competition which accommodates a two-dimensional issue space, and the
polar opposites of this axis are defined by the Left and the AfD. However,
this figure does not reveal which dimension is more salient for each party.
Actually, issue emphasis of the Greens and the AfD is mainly devoted to
socio-cultural issues, while the FDP and the Left are more concerned with
socio-economic issues.3 The CDU/CSU is placed at the very centre, a con-
sequence of Merkel’s moderate, less conservative course of action over the
past years. In principle, this provides an advantage for the CDU/CSU as
this shift has shortened the distance to the Greens, which now constitute
a potential coalition partner (Poguntke 2014: 960). At the same time, the
CDU/CSU allows space for a more conservative political party: the AfD.
After a neo-liberal phase under Chancellor Gerhard Schr€oder until
2005, the SPD has moved further to the left. However, in the meantime,
the SPD and CDU/CSU formed a centre coalition twice, a constellation
for which Sartori (1976) predicts a centrifugal competition because
Figure 1. Manifesto-based party positions at the 2017 federal election.
Note: Horizontal line: 0 ¼ left, 10 ¼ right; vertical line: 0 ¼ TAN, 10 ¼ GAL; the box represents the
centre space occupied by the governing Grand Coalition. The arrows symbolise the two-dimensional
centrifugal dynamics.
Data Source: Party Manifesto Data (Volkens et al. 2017), position scores calculated according to
Franzmann and Kaiser (2006).
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discontent with the government can only be expressed by voting for par-
ties far from the centre. Even though Sartori’s argument was originally
developed for a one-dimensional space, we can easily transfer it to a two-
dimensional space of competition: Unsatisfied voters with salient prefer-
ences on socio-cultural issues will vote for the Greens, the Left, or the
AfD, while those with salient preferences on socio-economic issues will
vote for the Left, the AfD, or the FDP. In Figure 1, the box in the middle
represents the centrist space occupied by the Grand Coalition. The arrows
symbolise the two-dimensional centrifugal dynamics. Translating Sartori’s
framework into an agent-based model, it can be shown that only coali-
tions of the left camp (e.g. the SPD, the Greens, and the Left) or the right
camp (the AfD, the FDP, and the CDU/CSU) could change the direction
of competition from a centrifugal to a centripetal one (Schmitt and
Franzmann 2019). The traditionally more conservative Christian
Democratic sister party CSU is suffering from this centrifugal dynamics
because it is less credible in taking a conservative position on socio-cul-
tural issues than the CDU. Hence, the centrifugal dynamic even works
within the Christian Democratic camp. Since both parties build a joint
electoral bloc, their core electorate is potentially torn on this issue. Thus,
according to issue-yield theory, CDU/CSU will avoid stressing socio-cul-
tural issues too much during the electoral campaigns.
Remarkably, compared to the demand side discussed above, the supply
side seems to be delayed in its adaptation. While, as Kitschelt (2003) sug-
gests, the demand side concentrates more and more on the vertical socio-
cultural dimension, the supply side is still a diagonal, thereby aligning
both dimensions of competition. The FDP keeps aloof from this main
supply-side competition axis, occupying the upper right corner represent-
ing a combination of economic right-wing and libertarian issues.
Contrary to other European countries (see D’Alimonte et al. 2019, and
De Sio and Lachat 2019), this reflects not a consequence of a de-ideolo-
gised political space. The FDP’s core issues, a combination of culturally
progressive and economically right concerns, leave the party’s location in
the competition space more or less unchanged in comparison to earlier
elections. Based on these observations we will now formulate our
expectations.
Party strategies: expectations
What are the rational strategies for the German parties, given the tension
between supply and demand sides caused by the transforming political
space and the simultaneous potentially centrifugal dynamic? Arguably, the
mainstream centre coalition partners avoided putting immigration and
related issues on the agenda since this would have divided their
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electorates. In addition, emphasising positional issues carries the risk of
strengthening the centrifugal dynamics of party competition – particularly
if positions on both sides of the spectrum are strongly associated with a
certain political party or political camp. According to issue-yield theory,
the mainstream coalition parties should have focused on valence issues
instead of positional issues. Moreover, as the two biggest mainstream par-
ties had been coalition partners for 8 out of the last 12 years, competing
on positional issues had become much more difficult for them – not just
because of credibility problems. The good government record on growth
and unemployment meant that economic valence issues should provide
the best risk-opportunity structure, especially for the major governing
party CDU. The SPD, being the junior coalition partner, was unlikely to
benefit to the same degree. Furthermore, such a strategy prevented the
SPD emphasising crucial differences to the CDU. The situation was some-
what different for the CSU, which plays a specific role as dominant
regional party in Bavaria and represents the conservative wing of the sis-
ter parties at the federal level. The CSU thus had some reason to mobilise
on the immigration issue. However, at the federal level, the CDU/CSU
core electorate was split over the immigration issue, which meant that
downplaying immigration should have been a rational overall strategy.
We expect the reverse pattern for the two opposition parties represent-
ing the poles on the socio-cultural dimension. The Greens and the AfD
had great incentives to focus on positional socio-cultural issues in order
to benefit from both the centrifugal dynamic of party competition and
the transforming demand side. The post-communist Left had the chance
to present itself as a challenger party not only opposed to the established
‘grand coalition state’, but also to the vanishing of political conflict over
economic issues. The FDP faced a more complicated situation than the
other opposition parties. The declining saliency of economic issues threat-
ened the attractiveness of their positional core issues regarding the free
market economy. It would have been rational for the Liberals to concen-
trate on economic valence issues instead of their free market position in
order to attract votes for their economic competence. However, as the
FDP had lost all seats in the previous Bundestag elections it was much
less visible and credible than before. In addition, it was still struggling to
reinvent itself – in terms of both policies and personnel (Giebler 2013).
To summarise, we formulate the following general expectations regard-
ing the three research questions that will guide the empirical analysis of
the 2017 election. In a first step, we investigate the degree to which the
ideologies of the twentieth century’s class struggle might have lost their
relevance for political competition. As we argued above, we assume that
due to the transformation of the political space, positional issues now
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mainly belong to the socio-cultural dimension. At the same time, we
expect that economic issues were less important. This should have
resulted in patterns of attitudes among party supporters which no longer
relate clearly to an underlying ideology and mix issues originating from
the two different dimensions in terms of high issue-yield scores.
Expectation 1: The German electorate is less aligned along the economic
left–right dimension and parties tend to mix left and right with GAL and TAN
positions to maximise vote shares.
The second research question addresses the patterns of valence and
position issues between parties. Due to the increased salience of socio-
cultural issues and the potentially centrifugal dynamic induced by the
Grand Coalition, both mainstream parties CDU/CSU and SPD should
reveal the highest issue yield on valence issues. Therefore, the most
promising strategy for both parties should be to concentrate on these
issues. Opposition parties, especially those with core issues belonging to
the socio-cultural dimension (AfD and Greens), should benefit mainly
from emphasising position issues. The Left, on the other hand, is a party
with core issues belonging to the economic dimension. Hence, the most
successful strategy for the Left should be to stick to its traditional core
economic position issues, opposing the declining relevance of economic
issues on the political agenda. Furthermore, in contrast to their party
elite, the Left’s voter base in East Germany has traditionally been split
on socio-cultural issues. The FDP as an established, long-lasting govern-
ment party also had the possibility to emphasise its competence on (eco-
nomic) valence issues.
Expectation 2a: As long-standing governing parties, CDU/CSU, SPD and
FDP strategically adapt best to the voters’ demands by a concentration on
valence issues.
Expectation 2b: As opposition parties, the AfD and the Greens strategically
adapt best to the voters’ demands by a concentration on socio-cultural positional
issues, in which their electorate is not split (compared to economic issues).
Expectation 2c: As opposition party with its core electorate split on socio-
cultural issues, the Left strategically adapts best to the voters’ demands by a
concentration on socio-economic positional issues.
Finally, we test the issue-yield assumption, which posits that parties’
behaviour is less driven by systemic salience than by issue yield, that is,
an individual risk–opportunity calculation for each single issue (see
D’Alimonte et al. 2019). In other words, we expect that parties focus on
those issues which promise to generate most support for them (high issue
yield) rather than on those which are highest on the overall public agenda
(high systemic salience).
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Expectation 3: Overall, issue yield explains party strategies better than the
systemic issue salience.
The concept of issue yield is not only strongly relying on a rationalist
(or electoralist) perspective on parties. In looking at citizens’ preferences
in positional as well as valence terms, it also assumes that voters pick par-
ties or electoral candidates with the goal of utility maximisation. Hence,
the concept should be ideally suited for and work better in contexts lack-
ing any kind of traditional party alignments or, at least, in contexts show-
ing strong dealignment. However, Germany is a case where to a certain
extent the ‘old’ linkages are still alive. Despite the declining electoral sup-
port of the two major parties, the CDU/CSU and the SPD, these remain
the strongest parties at the federal level. If the issue-yield concept also
works in Germany, this would have to be understood as strong support
for the more dynamic issue-yield view on party competition.
Research design, measurement, and methodological approach
The subsequent analysis uses the issue-yield model, which calculates the
specific gain that a party can expect from emphasising a certain issue in
an electoral campaign. As all country studies in this special issue are
based on the issue-yield concept as theoretical framework, this section
only highlights peculiarities of the German study. More general informa-
tion, especially regarding the set-up of the population surveys, the
approach to the Twitter data, and the calculation of the core indicators
like the issue-yield score can be found in D’Alimonte et al. (2019) and De
Sio and Weber (2019).
This study covers all major German parties that won seats in the 2017
election. In order of party size, these are CDU/CSU,4 SPD, AfD, FDP, the
Left, and the Greens, representing roughly 95% of the votes cast. In order
to address our three research questions, we need a comprehensive issue
battery covering all relevant aspects of political competition in Germany.
Due to the requirement of comparability for cross-national issue-yield
analysis, we included European Union membership, job market reform,
immigration, and referenda. The challenge was to identify all additional
issues that could become relevant during the electoral campaign in
Germany. First, we analysed the regular surveys of the Research Group
Elections (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen: Politbarometer 2018), which pro-
vide information on the most relevant issues in the German public
debate. As a second step, we investigated the electoral programmes of all
major parties in order to assess the particular importance of these issues
for the 2017 electoral campaign. We decided to remove only education
since it is a domain of German L€ander (states) and therefore not of major
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interest at the federal level. While defence spending and the state of
NATO are inherently relevant, all German parties avoided discussing
these issues during the electoral campaign. It was also not an issue of
major concern to the German public. Altogether, we identified 17 salient
positional issues that can be assigned to either of the two dimensions of
political competition (economic vs. cultural); for all of them a progressive
and a conservative stance can be formulated.5
Furthermore, we selected 10 valence issues: affordable homes, fighting
poverty of elderly people, infrastructure, fighting against terrorism,
unemployment, environmental protection, supporting families and chil-
dren, fighting against crime, social justice, and economic growth.
Theoretically, these issues could also be framed as positional issues.
However, as an inspection of the electoral manifestos shows, they repre-
sent common goals for all parties – a situation which is reflected in public
opinion data. In the online appendix we give an overview of all 27 issues
and their allocation to the socio-economic and socio-cultural conflict
dimension if applicable (see Tables A3 and A4).
Clearly, the validity of our findings on current German party competi-
tion depends on the comprehensiveness of our list of positional and
valence issues. We were able to rely on the most comprehensive issue bat-
tery regarding German elections ever administered. It was composed on
the basis of theoretical reasoning and the results from previous opinion
polls. While it may be surprising that important issues such as digitalisa-
tion and items regarding foreign policy are missing, it needs to be
emphasised that these policy areas played no role during the electoral
campaign.6 Hence, we are confident that our 27 issues cover all relevant
issue aspects and allow meaningful conclusions.
Answering our three research questions requires two different data
sources in order to calculate all relevant measures for the analysis. First, a
online survey (N¼ 1001) was administered by Demetra opinioni.net Italy
between 30 August and 13 September 2017, using predetermined quotas
for age/sex combinations, level of education, and geographical region.7
This data was used to calculate issue yield values for all 27 issues. In con-
trast to earlier approaches to issue yield (De Sio and Weber 2014), the
modified approach allows for the comparison of positional as well as
valence issues by taking into account parties’ credibility. The revised
measure of issue yield is presented in detail by De Sio and Weber (2019).
The most important consequence for our analysis here is that we can rely
on scores measuring how promising campaigning on certain issues actu-
ally is for different parties regarding positional and valence issues.8 For
the positional issues, we have used a scale ranging from 1 to 6 through-
out.9 As is shown in the online appendix, this information is then
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combined with information on whether a respondent thinks a respective
party is credible dealing with the issue. Issue-yield scores for valence
issues are also based on twofold information. First, we asked which par-
ties are competent to deal with the issue and, secondly, we asked how
important the issue is to the respondent. In addition, the data was used
to calculate the systemic salience for all issues.10
As a second data source, we looked at party communication in order
to identify their campaign strategies. This allows us to answer our third
research question: namely, whether a party’s campaign strategy is mainly
driven by systemic salience or by issue yield. To this end we conducted
extensive analysis of political competitors’ Twitter accounts. This
allowed us to generate measures of parties’ issue emphasis. Also, this
measure takes account of the changing nature of campaigning. We
selected both the official party accounts and the frontrunners’ Twitter
accounts or a relevant substitute to measure these strategies for all six
parties.11 The coding scheme mirrors our 27 pre-defined policy issues.
Altogether, we collected 3942 tweets published during the month before
the election of 24 September 2017. It is important to note that the cod-
ing scheme is based on issues and not on specific issue positions.12
While this is irrelevant for valence issues, it means that we assume that
parties are rational actors and have information on their ideal position
regarding the 17 positional issues. As a result, their communication
should be in line with more left/GAL positions or more right/TAN posi-
tions depending on their specific issue-yield scores.13 Regarding Twitter
use by parties, the issue-yield approach follows the empirically corrobo-
rated ‘press release assumption’ (De Sio et al. 2018), namely that parties
use Twitter to communicate their desired messages to the media. Thus,
the absolute number of followers is not decisive, but parties can use it
to address the media.
To answer research question 1 (do parties’ profiles still follow certain
ideological patterns and traditional political conflicts in terms of issue
stances?) we used issue-yield values for all parties and all issues. The
same is true for investigating which parties should, according to their
issue-yield profiles, focus more on valence or on positional issues in
their campaigns (research question 2). However, in addition to the ori-
ginal formula, we applied a centring approach to the scores to answer
research question 1. Similar to the approach of Franzmann and Kaiser
(2006) for Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data (Volkens et al.
2017), this gives us an insight into the relative issue yield. For example,
if the vast majority of the electorate support staying in the EU and the
majority of all voters of each party do so as well, all parties will have a
large issue yield for this issue position. However, campaigning on this
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issue position would not promise vote gains as the parties will not be
able to distinguish themselves from their competitors. Centring is based
on subtracting the average issue yield score of all left/GAL (or right/
TAN) positions regarding a specific issue from a given party’s score.14
As a consequence, positive values represent an issue-yield score higher
than the average score of all parties competing with the same issue
position while negative values indicate the opposite.
Finally, our third research question looks at the factors driving parties’
campaign behaviour. We use the proportion of Twitter posts regarding a
specific issue as the dependent variable measuring party behaviour. We col-
lected the Tweets within the two months before the election date. It is safe
to assume that the party elite had at least rough information based on sur-
veys about the electorate’s preferences. The two explanatory variables are
issue yield and systemic salience. Depending on which independent variable
is better able to explain party behaviour we can conclude that such behav-
iour is primarily driven by a party-specific strategy (issue yield) or systemic
salience. To control for the clustered data structure, we also include party
dummies and, as the dependent variable’s value range is bound between 0
and 1, we estimate the model in a Tobit set-up. Our findings based on
these models are robust for various model specifications.15
Analysis
Ideology underlying parties’ positional issue profiles
We start our analysis by inspecting the issue-yield profiles of German
parties regarding positional issues. How far do parties’ issue profiles still
reflect the traditional political conflicts of the twentieth century? To this
end, we calculate issue-yield scores which indicate the vote gain relative
to the magnitude of potential vote losses a party can expect from empha-
sising a certain issue. Regarding economic issues, the ideologically left
camp still benefits from its left-wing stances (see Table A5 in the online
appendix). Both the SPD and the Left reveal high issue yield for more or
less all left-wing positions on economic issues. Interestingly, the CDU/
CSU also reveals substantive yields for left-wing economic positions but
still slightly less than the Greens. Only the FDP and AfD benefit from
right-wing stances on economic issues; however, for the AfD, this applies
only to the issues of ‘using budgetary surplus to reduce tax levels’,
‘decreasing job market regulations’, and ‘not paying to save the euro’. The
FDP’s positional profile clearly points to focusing on right-wing stances
but, at the same time, the respective issue-yield scores only range between
0.06 and 0.13. In contrast, the AfD has a much higher yield (0.26) for
opposing any additional payment to save the euro. Nevertheless,
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positional stances on economic issues no longer provide a promising
strategy for very polarised electoral competition. With the exception of
the three issues mentioned, it only sets the FDP against all other relevant
parties. This shows that the traditional economic left–right conflict does
not discriminate very much between parties.
Inspecting the centred issue-yield scores provides important additional
information (Table 1). As described above, these scores inform us about a
party’s issue yield relative to the issue yield of all parties putting forward the
same stance on the issue. This follows from the fact that a party’s electoral
result is always relative to the results of its competitors. If two parties present
the same position during an electoral campaign but one party has a much
lower issue yield regarding this issue than the other party, the latter party will
win many more votes relative to the risk of losing votes. Knowing that parties
operate with limited resources, it would be much better for the party with the
lower issue yield to focus on a different issue in which it actually has a higher
issue yield than the other party.
Table 1 shows that four parties have a left-wing stance regarding
budgetary surplus. In contrast, the FDP and the AfD see budgetary sur-
plus as a possibility to reduce taxes – a right-wing position – indicated
by the grey boxes. For both groups of parties positive values refer to a
higher than average issue yield in comparison to other parties with the
same position. If we look to the budgetary-surplus issue, we see that
the SPD has a score of 0.11, which is the highest score of all parties
with a left-wing stance. In other words, the SPD would benefit the
most from campaigning on this issue. Clearly, there is a sharp distinc-
tion between the left-wing party camp of the SPD, the Left, and the
Greens, and the CDU/CSU and AfD. While the latter two parties have
more or less no incentive to campaign on economic issues – indicated
by the majority of negative values – the former group of parties should
have benefited from emphasising left-wing economic positions.
However, in the left-wing camp, the Greens show not only positive val-
ues. This is particularly pronounced for the reduction of income differ-
ences and for keeping job-market regulations. Given that the Green
Table 1. Issue yield of economic issues.
CDU/CSU SPD AfD FDP Left Greens
Surplus to reduce taxes/invest 0.11 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
Do not/reduce income differences 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.19 0.12
Increase/keep minimum wage 0.11 0.18 0.21 0.07 0.15 0.02
Decrease/keep job market regulations 0.10 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.10
Keep/increase pension age 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.04
Pay/do not pay money to save e 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.06
Note: Figures represent issue yield scores. Grey boxes refer to right economic positions while all
remaining figures refer to a higher issue yield of left stances. The table provides information on the
centred issue-yield scores - calculated as described above.
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electorate tends to be characterised by a very high socio-economic sta-
tus, this is not surprising.
In relative terms, the Green’s high issue-yield scores all belong to the
socio-cultural dimension, especially same-sex marriage and all issues
related to environmental politics (see Table 2).16 Interestingly, the Greens
are not the only party benefiting from a GAL profile. The SPD and the
Left also benefit more from GAL positions than from TAN positions.
However, while the SPD has at least some large and positive scores, for
example, keeping gay marriage legal or staying a member of the EU, the
Left would not benefit much in relative terms from concentrating an
electoral campaign on these issues. In contrast, the profile of the AfD is
strongly dominated by cultural issues favouring TAN stances. Everything
related to conservative positions on migration and refugees reveals a rela-
tively high yield. This supports our argument that the AfD and the
Greens represent the poles of the new and increasingly dominant socio-
cultural dimension. It also shows that the SPD and the Left have more or
less no overlap when looking at this dimension. The CDU/CSU and FDP
show a mixed profile with slight majorities for GAL positions. None of
the two parties would benefit much from emphasising TAN positions.
While the FDP has no positive score on cultural issues, the CDU/CSU
shows very high scores for GAL positions related to the EU. In general,
Table 2 supports our assumption that the socio-cultural dimension is now
more important for electoral competition than the economic dimension.
Here, we see larger differences – in terms of public opinion, party posi-
tions, and direction (GAL vs. TAN). Interestingly, with the exception of
the AfD, we find that all parties on the right benefit from emphasising
some GAL and some TAN positions. This might indicate an ongoing pro-
cess of reshuffling in the conservative camp.
Overall, German politics are rather dominated by progressive GAL and
economically left-wing issue positions. However, the FDP in economic
Table 2. Issue yield of cultural issues.
CDU/CSU SPD AfD FDP Left Greens
Leave/stay in the EU 0.23 0.13 0.21 0.06 0.22 0.09
Yes/no gender quotas 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
Keep/shut down nuclear plants 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.17 0.08 0.19
Keep/abolish gay marriage 0.13 0.15 0.09 0.18 0.01 0.14
Keep/restrict immigration laws 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08
Yes/no referendum 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.02
State/EU decides refugee quota 0.19 0.04 0.24 0.05 0.12 0.06
Ban/do not ban diesel cars 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.14 0.21
More/no more wind turbines 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.27
Full/no assimilation 0.01 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.11
More/limit refugees 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.01 0.06
Note: Figures represent issue yield scores. Grey boxes refer to TAN cultural positions while all
remaining figures refer to a higher issue yield of GAL stances. The table provides information on the
centred issue-yield scores - calculated as described above.
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and the AfD in socio-cultural terms clearly deviate from this general
trend. Moreover, there is a clear divide in terms of political camps: right/
TAN positions are completely irrelevant for centre-left parties (the SPD,
the Left, and the Greens), while they are of some importance for parties
on the right.
Figure 2 summarises these results within the two-dimensional space of
competition.17 We see slightly more polarisation regarding cultural issues
as well as no extreme position on the right-hand side of the economic
conflict dimensions. The CDU/CSU appears on both dimensions as
slightly progressive, reflecting that Merkel’s course of action finds support
within the electorate and is, or, at least, was, electorally promising. We
need to keep in mind, however, that the baseline of our estimates of
potential electoral gains is the current core electorate. Some would argue
that this might have been larger with a more conservative course over the
past years. Compared to the two-dimensional supply-side space that we
have illustrated in Figure 1 (based on manifesto data), the Greens’ elect-
oral potential is economically more to the right than their official party
manifesto. Figure 2 suggests that a potential ‘Jamaica coalition’ of CDU/
CSU, Greens, and the FDP should have been able to find an agreement
on economic issues because they did not constitute an electorally
Figure 2. Party positions based on issue-yield scores.
Note: Calculations are based on standardised issue-yield scores (see n. 17).
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promising battleground – unlike socio-cultural issues. Contrary to its
overall public presentation, the FDP reveals electoral potential with only
slightly right-wing economic stances while it is largely indifferent to cul-
tural issues. Due to this unique profile, the ‘Jamaica coalition’ would
probably have been costly for either the FDP or the CDU/CSU and the
Greens – depending on character of the coalition agreement on economic
policies. The SPD and the Left still represent one pole of the traditional
economic cleavage. Both parties rely on similar, but not the same eco-
nomic issues. While the Left is holding its strongest yield in classical
labour-market issues, the SPD has its stronghold in welfare state issues.
Nevertheless, a missing opponent makes it difficult to actually campaign
on these issues.
There is a final and very important difference between the supply and the
demand sides regarding the relationship of the two dimensions. While there
is a diagonal relationship present in terms of the supply side (Figure 1), party
positions based on issue yield lead to a spatial representation of German par-
ties which leaves much of the economically right-wing space empty. This is in
line with Kitschelt’s (2003: 130) expectation of a horizontal dimension shift-
ing into a vertical one. Remarkably, regarding the electorate, the Left is the
most progressive party on the economic dimension. The Greens and the SPD
reveal more progressive positions in terms of cultural concerns. Finally, the
AfD clearly is a unique actor in its positioning in the two-dimensional space
– even more when looking at issue-yield-based positions.
Valence or positional issues: which promise more benefits for which
of parties?
In our second analysis, we ask whether parties show higher issue yield for
positional or valence issues and whether there are any patterns confirming
our expectations 2a to 2c. In general, parties’ individual profiles change some-
what when we take valence issues into account. Valence issues dominate
across the entire electorate. This is reflected by the issue-yield pattern of the
governing parties. With the exception of the EU membership issue, valence
issues reveal the highest yield (Figure 3). This is in particular true for the
CDU/CSU and the FDP. The SPD presents a similar picture but positional
issues are important as well; expectation 2a is only partly confirmed. We also
see substantive differences between the CDU/CSU and SPD in terms of which
valence issues they could benefit from. The CDU/CSU shows higher yield in
fighting crime and terrorism and supporting economic growth while the SPD
potentially does well regarding welfare state issues. All three parties share EU
membership as the issue with the highest yield, signalling that an overwhelm-
ing majority of the German electorate still supports EU membership.
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The Left and especially the AfD have more to gain from positional
issues as they are not (yet) considered as potential coalition partners on
the federal level by their competitors and have, therefore, never been in
power. Likewise, with the exception of environmental policies, the elector-
ate of the Greens also primarily concentrates on positional issues. In
accordance with our expectations formulated above, important positional
issues belong to the socio-cultural dimension for both the AfD and the
Greens. Also in accordance with our expectation, valence issues are
indeed important for the FDP. However, while we see that economic pos-
itional issues would be beneficial for the Left, we do not see a similar pat-
tern for the FDP.
Issue yield vs. systemic issue salience: what determines
party strategies?
Finally, we analyse party strategy based on several Tobit regressions as
described above. These models allow us to investigate whether the parties’
campaign communication – understood as a measure of the individual
party’s campaign strategy – is influenced (more) by party-specific issue
yield or general systemic salience of an issue. As a reminder, our depend-
ent variable is the share of tweets a party sends out on a particular issue.
Hence, we are left with 27 issues for six parties resulting in 162 observa-
tions. Models 1 and 2 presented in Table 3 evaluate the independent
Ban/do not ban diesel cars
Keep/restrict immigration laws
Keep/shut down nuclear plants
Full/no assimilation
Providing affordable homes
Fighting poverty of elderly
More/limit refugees
State/EU decides refugee quota





Support the economic growth
Leave/stay in the EU
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6
position valence
Union
Do not/reduce income differences
Support the economic growth
Fighting crime
Protect from terrorism
Surplus to reduce taxes/invest
Maintaining infrastructure
Decrease/keep job market regulations






Support for families and children
Leave/stay in the EU






Keep/shut down nuclear plants
Yes/no gender quotas
Yes/no referenda
Ban/do not ban diesel cars
Fighting crime
Protect from terrorism
Leave/stay in the EU
State/EU decides refugee quota








Fighting poverty of elderly
Providing social justice










Support the economic growth
Leave/stay in the EU





Leave/stay in the EU





Support for families and children
Providing affordable homes
Fighting poverty of elderly
Providing social justice
Decrease/keep job market regulations
Do not/reduce income differences
Increase/keep minimum wage








Pay/do not pay money to save ?
Support for families and children
Surplus to reduce taxes/invest
Full/no assimilation
Leave/stay in the EU
Keep/abolish gay marriage
Ban/do not ban diesel cars
Keep/shut down nuclear plants
More/no more wind turbines
Protect the environment
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6
position valence
Greens
Figure 3. Issue-yield scores by issue type and party.
Note: The figure presents the 15 issues with the highest issue yield for each party.
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effect of issue yield – representing a party’s issue-specific strategic deci-
sion – and systemic salience, which refers to the proportion of respond-
ents indicating that the specific issue is of high importance to them. Both
variables have been standardised following Gelman’s (2008) approach,
which means that we can compare the coefficients directly. Clearly, issue
yield outperforms systemic salience. In general, parties use Twitter com-
munication strategically as more issue yield is associated with more tweets
regarding that issue. The explained variance is more than three times
higher for issue yield than for systemic salience.18 However, Model 3
shows that estimating a joint model provides the highest proportion of
explained variance. Issue yield and systemic issue salience independently
contribute to parties’ communication strategies – albeit with issue yield as
the dominant factor.
We expand Model 3 in two different ways to shed even more light on
the role of issue yield and systemic salience for party strategies. In a
fourth model, we interact party dummies with both explanatory variables
to test for party-specific differences. In a final model, we add an indicator
distinguishing between positional and valence issues and we interact this
new variable with issue yield and systemic salience. Result tables are pre-
sented in the online appendix (Table A7); here we present marginal effect
plots to visualise the results for the interactions (Figure 4).
Table 3. Explaining party strategies by issue yield and systemic issue salience.
(1) (2) (3)
M1: IY M2: SIS M3: both
General yield 0.067 0.062
(0.010) (0.010)
Systemic issue salience 0.039 0.028
(0.010) (0.009)
Party (base category: AfD)
CDU/CSU 0.023 0.014 0.021
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
SPD 0.041 0.004 0.039
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
FDP 0.006 0.008 0.005
(0.016) (0.017) (0.015)
Left 0.009 0.008 0.009
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Greens 0.015 0.012 0.014
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016)





Observations 162 162 162
VarExp 0.233 0.067 0.264
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When we integrate interaction effects of individual parties with their
issue yield and the systemic salience, the latter’s main effect becomes
insignificant. Inspecting the marginal effects for each party, we find that
especially the AfD but also the Left and the Greens rely primarily on an
issue-yield strategy. For the mainstream parties CDU/CSU and SPD we
find no significant difference. However, and in contrast to all other par-
ties, the FDP is clearly driven by systemic salience. This might be the
result of only low importance of the economic dimension, particularly the
right-wing economic positions, and the FDP’s status as a former and
long-term governing party (Franzmann 2019).
Finally, we analyse the marginal effects of the two explanatory variables
depending on the issue type. As the lower panel in Figure 4 shows, issue
yield is much more important than systemic salience for valence issues.
We assume that this pattern is driven by issue ownership. Regarding
valence issues, it might not be sufficient to focus on issues popular in and
Figure 4. Marginal effects of general yield and systemic salience by party and
issue type.
Note: Results are based on Tobit regressions presented in Table A4.
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relevant for the electorate. A party needs some credibility in dealing with
the respective valence issue. As credibility is represented in the conceptu-
alisation of the modified issue-yield approach (De Sio and Weber 2019),
we should indeed expect a stronger effect on valence issue and a different
pattern for positional issues. Looking at positional issues, we find signifi-
cant effects for both explanatory variables. Overall, issue yield is very
important for parties’ campaign behaviour – and more important than
systemic salience. However, our analysis shows that this is not universally
the case for all parties. At the same time, distinguishing issue types sup-
ports the high relevance of issue yield, especially for valence issues.
Discussion and conclusion
Of course, our analysis is not without limitations. First, we need to rely
on a single survey for a single election. Second, the issue battery had to
be developed before the peak of the electoral campaign and hence may
not have fitted perfectly the state of public debate close to election day.
Both problems could be overcome by collecting more data, ideally panel
data, including either a more extended issue battery or allowing for a
dynamic adaption of the questionnaire during the fieldwork period.
Third, since we focus on the last weeks of the electoral campaign, we are
not able to analyse party strategies and change between elections. Linked
to that: which role do events play for the issue-yield approach and party
competition in general? The literature suggests that a corresponding
cost–benefit logic might also be at work between elections (see Meyer and
Schoen 2017). A pathway for future research might be to collect and ana-
lyse data at different points during a legislative term in order provide a
full picture of how parties are able to adapt strategically to changing voter
environments.
These caveats notwithstanding, our analysis of the current German
party competition has indicated that primarily socio-cultural issues – first
and foremost linked to migration – contributed to the polarisation within
the German electorate. These issues also shape the central conflicts on the
supply side of politics, much more than other socio-cultural and eco-
nomic issues. Even the issue of European Union membership, despite
opposition by the AfD and to a certain extent by the Left, was not really
contested since the German electorate overwhelmingly supports member-
ship. Clearly, ideology has lost much of its structuring power for the eco-
nomic dimension. At the same time, the analysis of the cultural
dimension indicates either a transition period or a new polarisation
caused by the antagonism between the GAL Greens and the TAN AfD.
However, elections are not only won and lost due to positional issues. A
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clear pattern emerges regarding issue types: while the main governing
parties CDU/CSU and SPD focus on valence issues, opposition parties
can gain more from mobilising on positional issues. AfD, Greens, and the
Left act strategically in the sense that these parties tend to exploit their
issue yield by concentrating on these issues. The FDP is an exception
because it concentrates on valence issues and, at the same time, reacts pri-
marily to systemic salience.
Furthermore, our analysis using issue yield has revealed interesting ten-
sions between the supply and the demand sides of party politics.
Importantly, German party competition is asymmetric in three ways.
First, there is an asymmetry between the demand and supply sides of
competition, since parties’ programmatic offers are less concentrated on
socio-cultural issues than the demands of the electorate. The centrifugal
direction of party competition, as described by Sartori (1976) for a cen-
trist ‘Grand Coalition’, only manifests itself on the socio-cultural dimen-
sion. Second, we found an asymmetry between the governing and the
smaller opposition parties as only the latter tend to concentrate on pos-
itional issues. The CDU/CSU and SPD show higher issue-yield scores for
valence issues, which makes it more reasonable for them to campaign and
compete on them. Third, there is an asymmetry within the electoral com-
petition space or, more precisely, regarding the economic dimension. The
electorates of the Left and SPD still emphasise economic issues without
having a counterpart that effectively opposes left-wing positions with
stances linked to free-market ideology. While the FDP takes such posi-
tions in its manifesto, this does not lead to a correspondingly high issue
yield on the economic dimension as the majority of the German elector-
ate favours more left-wing policies.
Finally, one could argue that German politics has always been two-
dimensional, with socio-cultural issue being even more important than
socio-economic issues (Pappi 1984). However, this ‘old’ two-dimensional-
ity was mainly driven by issues of religiosity and church–state relations.
The transformation of the political space causes a new situation in two
regards. First, salient issues on the cultural dimension have changed.
Second, political competition does not simply reinforce the traditional
pattern, but especially cuts through the electorates of the mainstream par-
ties. Hence, while all parties have to adapt to this new situation – which
allowed the AfD to win a large number of votes only four years after its
foundation – the CDU/CSU and SPD find it very difficult to campaign
on the socio-cultural dimension as their own electorate is quite divided
when it comes to issues like migration.
Despite the serious attempt to form a so-called ‘Jamaica coalition’ con-
sisting of the CDU/CSU, FDP, and Greens after the 2017 election, our
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findings suggest that government formation processes in Germany will
become increasingly more complicated. The Green Party and its voters
are not far away from CDU/CSU and FDP on economic issues. However,
this is no longer the decisive dimension of competition in German polit-
ics. It is now the socio-cultural dimension and especially migration issues.
The Greens, with very liberal stances, contribute to the polarisation over
these topics, making a potential government compromise with CDU/CSU
and FDP difficult. At the same time, with its economically bourgeois con-
stituency, the Greens are increasingly less a natural coalition partner for
Social Democrats or even the post-communist Left. Irrespective of its cur-
rent status as a fundamental opposition party, the TAN-populist AfD
might become a future member of government coalitions together with
the FDP and CDU/CSU. We have already seen similar arrangements of
bourgeois mainstream parties coalescing with right-wing populists in the
Netherlands and Scandinavia. The only alternative is a Grand Coalition.
That is what we have observed in Germany since 2005 on a regular basis.
Most likely, the two main moderate parties in government will continue
to neglect the rising relevance of socio-cultural issues for strategic reasons
while opposition parties will continue to occupy polar opposites on
exactly these issues. As a result, we can expect further party system frag-
mentation. The rational behaviour of the two Grand Coalition parties
leads to a situation in which nothing else is possible but forming another
Grand Coalition. Given that the post-2017 Grand Coalition controlled
only 53.3% of the popular vote, this may turn out to be a dead end as a
situation in which even the former ‘grand coalition formula’ will fail to
gain a majority becomes ever more likely.
Notes
1. The only other Grand Coalition in (West) German post-war history was in
office from 1966 to 1969.
2. In addition to all manifesto coding categories belonging to the economic
dimension, the following categories are also included for calculating the
socio-economic party positions: per303 (efficiency), per504 and per505
(pro and contra welfare state expanses), per701, per702, per703, per704
(pro and contra trade unions, agriculture, middle class and professional
groups). All other categories are regarded as contributing to the socio-
cultural dimension.
3. The scores based on manifesto data (Volkens et al. 2017) in socio-cultural
issues (economic issues) are: AfD 69.3% (30.5%); Greens 68.67% (29.9%);
SPD 60.4% (39%); Left 58.3% (40.7%); CDU/CSU 56% (43.7%); FDP 48.9%
(49.6%); remainder to 100% equals the extent of uncoded sentences.
4. Even though CDU and CSU are separate parties, they do not compete
against each other (the CSU only runs in Bavaria, the CDU in all other
German states). They always form a common party group in parliament.
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5. Figure A2 in the online appendix presents the distribution of positions
regarding all 17 positional issues. Albeit to differing degrees, there is
polarisation in public opinion.
6. Less than 3% of German citizens consider them as one of the decisive
problems or issues in Germany (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen: Politbarometer
2018) and neither parties nor media nor public opinion put these topics on
the agenda during the election campaign.
7. Albeit there have been tremendous improvements, quota samples based on
online access panels still face the danger of being less representative than
data collected with other modes and methods. Fortunately, this is not the
case with our data. In the online appendix, we present some comparison
based on the face-to-face pre-election survey conducted by the German
Longitudinal Elections Study GLES (Roßteutscher et al. 2018) in terms of
party vote recall (Table A1 in the online appendix). In fact, the data used in
this analysis is only slightly less representative than the GLES data. Taking
into account that the GLES survey is based on more than double the
number of respondents and constitutes the most high-quality data available,
this makes us very confident regarding the validity of our findings. Finally,
all calculations of aggregated values using our survey data make use of a
post-stratification weight combining socio-demographic characteristics (sex,
age, geographical area, education) and past vote recall. The survey and
Twitter data were collected in the framework of the ICCP project (https://
cise.luiss.it/iccp/) and are available as GESIS study ZA7499, see De Sio
et al. (2019).
8. Following the logic of issue yield, for positional issues, all analyses are
restricted to the party-specific stance with a higher issue yield. For example,
the CDU/CSU has very high issue yield advertising for Germany to stay in
the EU. Consequently, the opposite position – leaving the EU – has a very
low issue yield and is no longer considered in the analyses. However, this
selection is party-specific and, hence, a left-wing position regarding a socio-
economic issue might be included due to its high yield for one party while
another party’s right-wing stance on the same issue also shows a high yield
and is therefore included as well.
9. In a few cases, we have decided to formulate rather extreme positions even
though this did not reflect the main thrust of the public debate (e.g. an
entire ban on diesel engine cars or leaving the EU). This was done in order
to capture all potential positions. Moreover, as Figure A2 in the online
appendix shows, we find substantive support for even extreme positions in
the German public for more or less all issues.
10. Systemic salience is defined as the percentage of respondents stating in the
mass survey that a certain issue is of ‘high’ importance, with respondents
reporting a ‘medium’ importance counted as half.
11. In general, we rely on the official party accounts plus those of the particular
frontrunner. CDU and CSU frontrunners had no individual Twitter
accounts. Therefore, the personal speaker of Angela Merkel, Steffen Seibert,
and the CSU general secretary’s account of Andreas Scheuer were chosen as
they are fulfilling the role of communication for their respective frontrunner
on Twitter. Merkel’s spokesperson Seibert is not a party official. However,
since he is the one who puts Merkel’s issues on the agenda, we decided to
include his official speaker account. The missing account of Alexander
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Gauland was replaced with the AfD’s party account since he was the
decisive person in the party headquarters.
12. On the Twitter data, we calculated a very high score of intercoder reliability
(Cohen’s kappa ¼ 0.91).
13. Consequently, testing the effect of issue yield on Twitter issue salience is
conservative as the correlation is – if at all – biased towards 0 because we
cannot distinguish between left/GAL positions and right/TAN positions for
each issue.
14. If there is only one party with a left/GAL or right/TAN stance, we kept the
original score.
15. We present several robustness checks in the online appendix. For example,
the interpretation of our findings does not change if we estimate the model
with cluster-corrected standard errors (clustered by issue; see Table A2).
There is also no substantive difference when running 27 additional models –
each leaving out one of the issues. The latter test would detect strong effects
of a single issue which is, as Figure A1 shows, not a problem for our study.
16. The original values can be found in Table A6 in the online appendix.
17. We standardised all issue-yield scores between 0 and 1 for each party and
dimension (economic vs. cultural) based on their empirical minimum and
maximum. In a second step, the resulting values were multiplied with –1 in
case of economic left-wing and socio-cultural conservative positions. We
then calculated the average value for each party for both dimensions.
18. Calculating values of variance explained for Tobit regressions is far from
straightforward. Like the other contributions to this special issue, we rely on
a computational approach developed by De Sio and Weber (2019).
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